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AN ANALYSIS OF CRUMMEY AND
THE ANNUAL EXCLUSION
KENT MASON*
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 2503(b) of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) al-
lows a taxpayer to exclude $10,000 of his gifts to each donee
from his total taxable gifts for each year.' Generally, to qual-
ify for this exclusion, a gift must meet two basic requirements.
First, the gift must be of a present interest. Second, the tax-
payer must show with reasonable certainty that the present
interest is worth at least the amount excluded.2
In 1968, the Ninth Circuit in Crummey v. Commissioners
held that if a person has the right to compel immediate distri-
bution from a trust of $X, and is legally capable of exercising
the right either on his own or through a natural or legal
guardian,4 the person has a present interest to the extent of
$X.5 So if a donor contributes $10,000 to a trust and gives the
beneficiary the right to demand the $10,000, the full exclusion
* B.A., Amherst College, 1976; J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1980; Law Clerk
to Judge Phyllis Kravitch, Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, 1980-81. Mr. Mason is an
associate in the firm of Long, Aldridge, Heiner & Stevens, Atlanta, Georgia.
1. I.R.C. § 2503 (West Supp. 1981) provides in relevant part
(b) Exclusions From Gifts - In the case of gifts (other than gifts of future
interests in property) made to any person by the donor during the calendar
year, the first $10,000 of such gifts to such person shall not, for purposes of
subsection (a), be included in the total amount of gifts made during such year.
Where there has been a transfer to any person of a present interest in prop-
erty, the possibility that such interest may be diminished by the exercise of a
power shall be disregarded in applying this subsection, if no part of such inter-
est will at any time pass to any other person.
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 441(a), 1981 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. N.ws 150 (amending I.R.C. § 2503(b) (1976)) (increasing the annual
exclusion from $3,000 to $10,000).
2. See Stark v. United States, 477 F.2d 131, 132 n.1 (8th Cir. 1973); Treas. Reg. §§
25.2503-3(a), -3(b) (1972).
3. 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968).
4. If the latter has to be appointed, this has to be legally possible for the right
holder to accomplish, though he may do so indirectly. For example, in Crummey the
court suggested that the beneficiary could simply demand his share from the trustee.
The trustee would have a duty to petition the court for the appointment of a legal
guardian. Furthermore, a breach of this duty by the trustee "would not... vitiate
the demand" even if the beneficiary was unable to sue. Id. at 87.
5. See also Rev. Rul. 73-405, 1973-2 C.B. 321.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
is available to the donor due to the existence of the demand
right.
There has been little law defining the scope of the demand
right rule articulated in Crummey. Thus, many questions re-
main unanswered or inadequately addressed. This article will
both identify important issues that have been resolved and
discuss those which need resolution.
Examination of these issues reveals Crummey to have sub-
stantial potential as a device for gift tax avoidance. In light of
this potential, an amendment to section 2503 is proposed
which would deny exclusions based on demand rights. This
article also analyzes whether the annual exclusion should be
limited to present interests and concludes that this limitation
actually works contrary to the government's interest in ad-
ministrative convenience, the purpose for which the limitation
was included in the statute. Finally, the appropriateness of
having the exclusion apply to each donee is critically ex-
amined and it is proposed that the annual exclusion be
changed to a flat dollar figure encompassing gifts to all
donees.
II. THE ANNUAL EXCLUSION IN GENERAL
With respect to the present interest requirement, there are
two main points which are important as background to a dis-
cussion of the Crummey rule. First, a present interest must be
an absolute right. If a trustee has discretion to withhold from
the donee of the 'demand right part or all of the transfers to
the trust otherwise subject to the right, then the part of the
transfers subject to that discretionary power is not a present
interest.6 Second, to have a present interest, one must have
present "use, possession, or enjoyment" of the underlying as-
sets.7 For example, the right to demand distribution of a re-
6. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 25.2.503-3(c)(1) (1972); Fondren v. Commissioner, 324
U.S. 18, 21 (1945); Hamilton v. United States, 553 F.2d 1216, 1218 (9th Cir. 1977);
Street v. Commissioner, 261 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1958); Hockman v. United States, 327
F. Supp. 332 (D. Md. 1971); see also I.R.S. Private Letter Ruling 8213074 (Dec.,
1982). But see Morgan v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 1080 (1964) (circumstances indicate
the discretion will be exercised to produce a steady flow of income).
7. Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2503-3(a), -3(b) (1972).
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mainder interest in real property is not a present interest even
though the remainder interest might be readily marketable.8
Most of the law interpreting the second requirement nec-
essary to qualify for the annual exclusion - that the taxpayer
show with reasonable certainty that the present interest is
worth at least the amount excluded - arises in the context of
income interests. A brief discussion of the law in this area is
necessary to analyze the relevance of this requirement to the
Crummey rule. There are two ways for a taxpayer to show
that an income interest is worth the amount excluded. The
first way is to demonstrate that due to the nature of the
corpus a specific amount of income will be produced.9 The al-
ternative means of valuing an income interest is through use
of the valuation tables. To be entitled to use the tables for
purposes of the exclusion, a taxpayer must show with reasona-
ble certainty that the trust will produce income during a pre-
dictable period of time and that the rate will not be fixed 0
below that assumed in the tables;"" this showing is necessary
8. See Fondren v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 18 (1945). One "exception" (although
not admitted to be such) to this principle is a contractual obligation. Where a con-
tractual obligation, such as a note, bond, annuity or insurance contract is given out-
right, the gift is one of a present interest under the regulations even though the obli-
gation is not due until sometime in the future. Tress. Reg. § 25.2503-3(a) (1972).
9. For example, the donor may give the donee the income interest in a trust which
is funded by a bond paying a certain rate of interest. If the trust instrument compels
the trustee to keep the bond, not to sell and reinvest it under any circumstances, then
the value of the income interest must be calculated based on the interest paid by the
bond. See Rev. Rul. 77-195, 1977-1 C.B. 295, 299 (valuing an interest not for exclu-
sion purposes, but for taxation).
10. For the government to establish that a rate is "fixed," it need not show that
the rate will definitely be a certain figure (such as the bond example, supra note 9):
reasonable certainty is sufficient. For example, if the trust compelled retention of
stock of a company with an established dividend policy of paying no more than two
percent, this, too, could be viewed as a fixed rate. See Christ v. Commissioner, 480
F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1973).
11. The I.R.S. test for use of the tables for purposes of taxation instead of exclu-
sion is slightly different. But cf. Vernon v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 484 (1976) (citing
exclusion valuation cases in a case valuing a gift for taxation purposes). When the
I.R.S. is valuing a gift to determine its value for purposes of taxation, again any fixed
rate of income must be used, but otherwise the tables must be used if it is realisti-
cally possible that the trust will produce income at the statutorily assumed rate. For
example, if A transfers to B an income interest in nonincome producing property, the
tables must still be used if the trustee has the power to sell the property and reinvest
in income producing property. Rev. Rul. 79-280, 1979-2 C.B. 340. See also Christ v.
Commissioner, 480 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1973) (for taxation purposes, tables must be
used unless they would produce a "result substantially at variance with the facts");
1982]
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to demonstrate that the figure derived from the tables is a
"fair approximation" of the value of the income interest.12
One aspect of this "reasonable certainty" standard is rele-
vant outside the context of income interests to the valuation
of all gifts, including present interests: where valuation re-
quires consideration of probabilities incapable of mathemati-
cal proof, the courts and the Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.)
often refuse to engage in such speculation and hold the value
not to be reasonably ascertainable.1 s The test implicitly guid-
ing them in each such determination is whether the adminis-
trative burden of considering such probabilities outweighs the
need to consider them in order to maintain a realistic and ef-
fective tax system.1 4 This test is generally applicable to valua-
tions in the annual exclusion context, including valuation of
Crummey demand rights.
Weller v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 790 (1962) (for taxation purposes, tables must be
used unless the figure derived would be "unrealistic and unreasonable"); Rev. Rul.
77-195, 1977-1 C.B. 295. The rationale behind this rule is probably that it prevents
evasion of the gift tax through a transfer of an income interest in nonincome produc-
ing property which the donor knows will be immediately sold and the proceeds rein-
vested in income producing property.
12. See Berzon v. Commissioner, 534 F.2d 528 (2d Cir. 1976).
13. See, e.g., Van Den Wymelenberg v. United States, 397 F.2d 443 (7th Cir. 1968)
(refusal to speculate on manner in which the trustee would exercise his absolute dis-
cretion); Rev. Rul. 75-415, 1975-2 C.B. 374 ("[s]ince such a volitional act [terminating
enrollment in college] ... is not mathematically predictable," no proof will be ac-
cepted concerning it (implicitly holding)); see also Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(e) (1973)
(gift of partial interest which cannot be valued by generally accepted valuation prin-
ciples is valued as if entire interest transferred); but see Morgan v. Commissioner, 45
T.C. 1080 (1964). The need to avoid excessive administrative burdens has led to such
rulings. However, in many circumstances, courts do make valuations which cannot be
supported by mathematical proof. For example, in determining whether use of the
tables is appropriate, courts must speculate as to whether dividends will be paid on
stock. See generally Christ v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1973). Neither
the courts nor the I.R.S. articulates any criteria for when valuations based on
nonmathematical probabilities should be undertaken. However, as noted in the text
infra, the implicit rule must be based on a weighing process: such valuations should
be made when they are so essential to the proper functioning of a realistic and effec-
tive tax system that the administrative burden is justified. Whether a valuation is
essential should be governed by two factors: how common the type of interest is and
the purpose of the valuation, i.e., whether the valuation is of a taxable gift or of an
amount the taxpayer would like to exclude from or offset against taxable gifts. Com-
pare Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(f) (1973) with Tress. Reg. § 25.2511(e) (1973).
14. See supra note 13.
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III. DRAFTING Crummey DEMAND RIGHTS
It is not the purpose of this article to provide a compre-
hensive guide to drafting Crummey demand rights.15 How-
ever, certain key drafting issues - those necessary as back-
ground for the policy proposals and those which have been
inadequately treated in the commentary - are analyzed
herein.
A. Means of Exercising the Right to Compel a
Distribution
The obvious concern of a drafter of a trust attempting to
create an exclusion is: what trust attributes are required for a
right to compel a distribution from a trust to fall within the
Crummey rule? One issue, often overlooked, is the means the
trust may require for the donee to compel the distribution
from the trust. In other words, is the exclusion available if the
beneficiary must, to compel the distribution, do more than
simply demand it?
If the donee of a right to compel a distribution from a
trust may only exercise it by the performance of an act of in-
dependent significance, such as terminating enrollment in col-
lege, Revenue Ruling 75-415 holds that such a right is not a
15. For a survey of drafting issues and problems, see Simmons, Drafting the
Crummey Power, 15 INST. ON EsT. PLAN. 1700 (1981). There is, in addition, one area
which the I.R.S. has recently spotlighted for further study. Rev. Proc. 81-32, 1981-34
I.R.B. 22 adds a provision to section 5 of Rev. Proc. 81-10, 1981-1 C.B. 647. Section 5
is entitled: Areas Under Extensive Study in which Rulings or Determination Letters
Will Not Be Issued Until the Service Resolves the Issue Through Publication of a
Revenue Ruling, Revenue Procedure, Regulations or Otherwise. The provision added
reads:
Section 2503 - Taxable Gifts - Whether the transfer of property to a trust
will be a gift of a present interest in property when (1) the trust corpus con-
sists or will consist substantially of insurance policies on the life of the grantor
or the grantor's spouse, (2) the trustee or any other person has a power to
apply the trust's income or corpus to the payment of premiums on policies of
insurance on the life of the grantor or the grantor's spouse, (3) the trustee or
any other person has a power to use the trust's assets to make loans to the
grantor's estate or to purchase assets from the grantor's estate, (4) the trust
beneficiaries have the power to withdraw, on demand, any additional transfers
made to the trust, and (5) there is a right or power in any person that would
cause the grantor to be treated as the owner of all or a portion of the trust
under sections 673 to 677.
For a discussion of the gift described above, see Plaine, How to Take Full Advan-
tage of the Increased Exclusion for Gifts of Present Interests, 27 TAx. ACCT. 366,
370-71 (1981).
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present interest and thus the donor would not be entitled to
exclude any transfers to the trust based on the demand
right."" This position has not been challenged in court. If it
were, the denial of the exclusion would probably be sustained,
but would be better supported by a holding that the value of
the right is not reasonably ascertainable, rather than a finding
that the right is not a present interest. The hypothetical gift
used in the Revenue Ruling 75-415 illustrates the valuation
problems. The donee had the right to a portion of the trust
income when he stopped attending college. It was within the
beneficiary's power to exercise the right presently, so that the
interest appears to be a present interest.17 However, its value
could only be determined by subtracting from the value of an
unrestricted income interest the value to the beneficiary of at-
tending college, the condition which must be met before the
right can be enjoyed. Clearly, valuing the subjective worth of
attending college is an impractical administrative task. Even
valuing the objective value of going to college at that time,
considering the beneficiary's talents and opportunities, is diffi-
cult, speculative and time consuming.
As noted, the courts and the I.R.S. have repeatedly held
that avoiding such burdens justifies denying the taxpayer an
16. Rev. Rul. 75-415, 1975-2 C.B. 374.
17. Rev. Rul. 75-415, 1975-2 C.B. 374, does not explain why the I.R.S. does not
consider the demand right to be a present interest. One could argue that there is no
present interest based on the requirement that a present interest be an "unrestricted
right." Tress. Reg. § 25.2503-3(b) (1972). What the regulations mean by "un-
restricted" is unclear. For instance, if A gives B real estate worth $100,000 subject to
a $40,000 mortgage, there is no doubt that there is a present interest transferred of
$60,000, despite the fact that the right to the real estate as a whole is in a sense
"restricted" by the existence of the mortgage. The point is that the excess value,
$60,000, is "unrestricted." The same analysis is appropriate with respect to the hypo-
thetical gift in the text.
The "unrestricted" requirement does not seem appropriate even in the context of
restrictions'directly on the right to use, such as restricting the use of transferred real
estate to residential purposes. A transfer of such real estate is clearly a present inter-
est to the extent of its value. Perhaps the "unrestricted" language was aimed at ef-
forts of the donor to control the beneficiary's use in ways which rendered the prop-
erty incapable of valuation, such as a restriction which required the beneficiary to
house any relative who asked for a room. This reading would merge the valuation
requirement into the present interest requirement in this context. If this was the aim
of the "unrestricted" language, the regulation could be used in the situation described
in the text. However, it would be more sensible to simply find that the value of such a
"restricted" gift is not reasonably ascertainable than to rely on such a strained read-
ing of "unrestricted."
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opportunity to present evidence on the question of valuation
when valuation of the interest at issue is not essential to the
maintenance of a realistic and effective tax system. An analy-
sis of the factors relevant to a determination of whether a val-
uation is so essential18 indicates that valuation of the interest
at issue in Revenue Ruling 75-415 is not so essential.19 This
requirement, that the act triggering the right to receive a dis-
tribution not have independent significance, is the only re-
striction which has been placed on the type of demand that
may be required under the terms of the trust.2 0
B. Time and Notice Requirements
No case has discussed how much time and notice must be
given the beneficiary to exercise the demand right. Revenue
Ruling 81-7,21 however, has articulated a general rule requir-
ing timely notice.21 In Revenue Ruling 81-7, the beneficiary of
the trust, A, had a right to demand, with respect to any do-
nor's contribution, the lesser of $3,000 or the donor's contri-
butions during the year. The right lapsed if not exercised by
December 31 of any given year. G created and funded the
trust near the end of the year;23 neither G nor the trustee in-
formed A of his demand right. The I.R.S. held that G was not
entitled to an exclusion for the year in which the trust was
created:
In failing to communicate the existence of the demand right
and in narrowly restricting the time for its exercise, G did
not give A a reasonable opportunity to learn of and to exer-
cise the demand right before it lapsed. G's conduct made the
demand right illusory and effectively deprived A of the
power.
[The grant of a demand right does not create a present
interest] if the donor's conduct makes the demand right illu-
sory and effectively deprives the donee of the power.
18. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
19. The gift at issue in Rev. Rul. 75-415, 1975-2 C.B. 374 is relatively uncommon;
moreover, the valuation would have been for exclusion purposes.
20. Rev. Rul. 75-415, 1975-2 C.B. 374.
21. Rev. Rul. 81-7, 1981-1 C.B. 474.
22. There is, however, no indication that actual knowledge is not an adequate sub-
stitute for timely notice. See Simmons, supra note 15, at 1708.3.
23. The ruling does not indicate precisely when the funding occurred.
1982]
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Both before and after this revenue ruling, the same princi-
ple has been applied in private letter rulings. The rulings
make clear that the beneficiary must not only have notice of
the demand right,2 4 but also of any addition to the trust sub-
ject to his demand right.2 5
Revenue Ruling 81-7 does not specify how much time is
necessary to provide a reasonable opportunity to exercise the
demand right.26 However, private letter rulings and common
sense can be relied on to flesh out the time requirement.
I.R.S. Private Letter Ruling 7922107 holds that if a natural
guardian cannot, under applicable state law, make the de-
mand, the beneficiary must be given sufficient time to exercise
his right so that it is legally possible for him to have a legal
guardian appointed before the right expires.
The private letter rulings have not articulated any further
criteria for determining whether the donee has been given suf-
ficient time to exercise his demand right. In fact, only one has
indicated a possible minimum required time. In I.R.S. Private
Letter Ruling 8111123,25 the I.R.S. refused to express an opin-
ion as to the availability of the exclusion if a transfer were
made after December 21 and the donee had only until the end
of the year to exercise the right. In other private letter rulings,
the I.R.S. has affirmed the availability of the exclusion where
the time allowed ranged from four weeks from the contribu-
tion' 9  to ninety days from receipt of notice of the
24. See, e.g., I.R.S. Private Letter Rulings 8019038 (Feb. 12., 1980), 8006048 (Nov.
16, 1979), 8003033 (Oct. 23, 1979) and 7946007 (July 26, 1979).
25. See, e.g., I.R.S. Private Letter Rulings 8121069 (Feb. 26, 1981), 8121051 (Feb.
26, 1981), 8111122 (Dec. 19, 1980), 8051128 (Sept. 26, 1980), 8044080 (Aug. 11, 1980),
8019038 (Feb. 12, 1980), 8007080 (Nov. 26, 1979) and 8006048 (Nov. 16, 1979). If the
contributions are to be made in the form of premium payments to the insurance com-
pany which issued the policy which is the corpus of the trust, it appears that the
trustee may simply provide the beneficiary with a payment schedule. See, e.g., I.R.S.
Private Letter Ruling 8138102 (June 25, 1981).
If the beneficiary is a minor, all notices of contributions (and of the demand right)
must be sent to his guardian. Id. (The ruling specifies the natural guardian: presuma-
bly, if the natural guardian is, under state law, incapable of exercising the demand
right, he could petition for the appointment of a legal guardian).
26. Rev. Rul. 81-7, 1981-1 C.B. 474.
27. I.R.S. Private Letter Ruling 7922107 (March 5, 1979).
28. The facts set out in I.R.S. Private Letter Ruling 8111123 (Dec. 19, 1980) were
corrected in I.R.S. Private Letter Ruling 8115099 (Jan. 19, 1981).
29. I.R.S. Private Letter Ruling 8103074 (Oct. 23, 1980).
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contribution."0
In making its decisions in the private letter rulings, the
I.R.S. undoubtedly tacitly applied one rule: the donee must
have time to make the demand on the trustee in a normally
acceptable fashion, such as by mail. Furthermore, the I.R.S.
may be silently applying another rule: the beneficiary and
guardian must be given, after notice of the demand right and
of a contribution, sufficient time to carefully assess the tax
and nontax effects of allowing the assets to remain in the
trust. If the I.R.S. is indeed applying such a rule, this raises
several issues.31 First, there is no reason that the time for as-
sessment should have to follow the transfer to the trust. For
example, why couldn't a donor notify a donee on November 1
that a transfer to the trust would be made on December 20,
thereby giving the donee sufficient time to consider his op-
30. I.R.S. Private Letter Ruling 8051128 (Sept. 26, 1980).
31. One issue is whether any notice or time for mature assessment should be re-
quired. Realistically, the demand right is meaningless, i.e., it is hardly ever created
unless it is clear the right will not be exercised (or unless it is clear that the right will
only be exercised to the extent necessary to cover the donee's tax liabilities arising
from possession of the right). Since this is so, it does not matter whether the donee
has notice or time to reflect. However, the crucial point is that recognition of the
meaninglessness of the demand right is inconsistent with the grant of an exclusion
based on it. See infra note 65 and accompanying text. Thus, if exclusions are granted
based on demand rights, time for reflection should be required.
The right is largely meaningless because if one wants another person to have a
choice for a very short time, such as five or six weeks, of taking money or not, there is
little reason to spend the extra time and money on formal transfers to and possibly
from a trust or to expose the offeree to the effects of a demand right. The possession
of a demand right may have adverse income tax and estate tax effects on a donee,
while lapse of a demand right may have adverse gift tax and estate tax effects on him.
See infra notes 36, 41 & 43-48 and accompanying text. These problems would be
avoided if the donee were given, instead of a demand right, an informal choice as to
whether to accept a gift. (Possession of such an informal offer, not binding on the
offeror, should not give rise to any of the adverse effects described supra.)
One possible instance where the right is not meaningless is where the donor wants
the assets out of his possession immediately, possibly to avoid imminent appreciation
and the accompanying increase in gift or estate tax. In this instance, he may want to
have A have the choice, but if A does not want the assets, the donor may want them
to go to B. Here A would have a real choice, but such circumstances are probably
rare. Another possible situation where a short-lived demand right would be exercised
is where the trust has liquid assets, the beneficiary needs money, the trustee cannot
invade the trust assets and the settlor can only transfer nonliquid assets he does not
want sold. In such a rare situation, the donor would (after transferring the nonliquid
assets to the trust) notify the donee, for the donee's exercise is the purpose of the
transfer. Furthermore, in such a situation time to assess the need for the liquid assets
is unnecessary.
1982]
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tions prior to a December 31 expiration date? 2 Furthermore,
the logical extension of this argument is that the demand
right itself may precede the contribution." For instance, a
trust could provide that a right to demand the lesser of $X or
the donee's pro rata share of the donor's contributions during
the year arises on November 1 and lasts until December 31.
The donee would have two months to consider his options and
to exercise the right if that were his decision. The contribu-
tion itself could be made as late as December 31; the only
function it would serve would be to fix the amount the donee
would be entitled to receive pursuant to his demand, if
made. 4 (Because such an arrangement has not been directly
32. A rule approving such a structure would have particular application to insur-
ance trusts where the contributions are in the form of premium payments and the
trustee gives the donee a schedule of future payments. See supra note 25. (It is in
insurance trusts that Crummey demand rights are most often used. See generally
Simmons, supra note 15, at 1 1711.) A payment could be due on December 20 as in
the example in the text.
33. See Szarwark, Drafting Crummey Powers: The Current Rulings Scene, 1981
EsT. PLAN. INsT. 483, 489 (Notre Dame).
34. Id. One problem with such a trust would be that transfers made prior to Nov-
ember 1 would not be present interests. Transfers made after November 1, however,
would be present interests even though they did not trigger the demand right. To
analyze why this latter assertion is so, one must understand why the demand right
creates an exclusion. The transfer of the right itself is not necessary: in the years after
the creation of the trust, no such transfer occurs and yet an exclusion is allowed
based on the contribution. This is so because the contribution in conjunction with the
existence of the demand right creates the present right in the donee of the demand
right. Because the contribution creates a present interest in the donee, it is consid-
ered to be a transfer of a present interest to that donee. However, it should not be
necessary that the contribution create the present right. A contribution which gives
value to a present right that already exists should also be considered a transfer of a
present interest, because in real terms giving value to an existing right is actually a
transfer of a right.
To solve the first problem - that transfers made before November 1 would not be
present interests - one could provide that the demand right exists all year. The
difficulties encountered in having demand rights last for an extended period is dis-
cussed infra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
An additional issue is the applicability of I.R.C. §§ 678 and 2041 (1976 & West
Supp. 1981), discussed infra notes 43-48 and accompanying text, to the period during
which the right may be exercised but no contribution has been made. This applica-
tion is uncertain due to the lack of authority. However, it appears that theoretically §
678(a)(1) should not be applicable until the contribution is made; thus, there is a
significant advantage to use of an arrangement like the one described in the text.
(The application of § 678(a)(2) is unchanged.) The result under § 2041 - if the donee
dies while the right is outstanding but before the contribution is made - is difficult
to predict due to the valuation issue. The § 2041 problem could, of course, be avoided
by having the donor refrain from making contributions for that year; however, this
[Vol. 65:573
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addressed by the I.R.S., the discussion hereafter is based on
the more conventional trust provision, under which the contri-
bution triggers the demand right.)
Finally, an argument could be made that after the initial
year, no time for assessment need be allowed. The argument
would be that in the first year the donee has the opportunity
to determine in general the tax and nontax effects of allowing
the right to lapse or of exercising it. In the ensuing years, the
donee is able to monitor the factual variables which would in-
fluence his decision if at any time a demand right were to be
triggered by a contribution. Whether it is realistic to expect a
donee to constantly perform such monitoring is, however,
doubtful; thus, following the first year it should be expected
that the I.R.S. may require that some short time be allowed
for deciding whether or not to exercise the right. 5
C. Demand Rights Which Are Effective During Two Years
An additional drafting consideration involves confining the
period during which the demand right is valid to the taxable
year in which the donor made his contribution. Two potential
problems arise if the period extends into a subsequent year.
First, there is a possibility that the exclusion will be denied. If
the contribution is made December 31, the demand right,
even if valid for sixty days, is illusory in the year of the contri-
bution; the right is not a present interest until the following
year when the donee presumably has sufficient notice and
time to exercise it. However, if the contribution were made
early enough, December 1, for example, the fact that the de-
mand right extends beyond the end of the year would not
render the right illusory during the initial year.
The second problem would be that under I.R.C. sections
2041(b)(2) and 2514(e), e the lapse of the donee's demand
could be detrimental to the donor's estate plan.
35. This entire discussion assumes that it is realistically possible that A will exer-
cise his demand right. Although this assumption may not be accurate in practice, see
supra note 31, the I.R.S., in sustaining exclusions based on demand rights, implicitly
finds that the assumption is appropriate; otherwise no exclusion should be available
based on a demand right.
36. I.R.C. § 2514 (1976) provides in relevant part-
(b) Powers Created After October 21, 1942. The exercise or release of a
general power of appointment created after October 21, 1942, shall be deemed
a transfer of property by the individual possessing such power.
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right - which is a general power of appointment - would
occur in the subsequent year when his right expired. 7 Under
(c) Definition of General Power of Appointment. For purposes of this sec-
tion, the term "general power of appointment" means a power which is exercis-
able in favor of the individual possessing the power (hereinafter in this subsec-
tion referred to as the "possessor"), his estate, his creditors, or the creditors of
his estate; except that -
(1) A power to consume, invade, or appropriate property for the ben-
efit of the possessor which is limited by an ascertainable standard relat-
ing to the health, education, support, or maintenance of the possessor
shall not be deemed a general power of appointment ....
(e) Lapse of Power. The lapse of a power of appointment created after Oc-
tober 21, 1942, during the life of the individual possessing the power shall be
considered a release of such power. The rule of the preceding sentence shall
apply with respect to the lapse of powers during any calendar year only to the
extent that the property which could have been appointed by exercise of such
lapsed powers exceeds in value the greater of the following amounts:
(1) $5,000, or
(2) 5 percent of the aggregate value of the assets out of which, or the
proceeds of which, the exercise of the lapsed powers could be satisfied.
Under the regulations, it does not appear that the legal incapacity of the holder of
the demand right to exercise it is relevant if the holder has a guardian (or can have
one appointed) capable of exercising it on his behalf. Treas. Reg. § 25.2514-3(c)(4)
(1972) ("In any case where the possessor of a general power of appointment is incapa-
ble of validly exercising or releasing a power, by reason of minority, or otherwise, and
the power may not be validly exercised or released on his behalf, the failure to exer-
cise or release the power is not a lapse of the power.") (emphasis added). Despite the
apparent meaning of this regulation, a number of commentators have read it to mean
that regardless of the existence of a guardian capable of exercising the right, a mi-
nor's failure to exercise a power is not a lapse of that power. See, e.g., Lischer, The
Crummey Trust, 1979 EST. GiFTs & TR. J. 17, 20. Cf. Simmons, supra note 15, at
1712.2 (noting, however, that the I.R.S. will probably follow Rev. Rul. 73-405, 1973-2
C.B. 321 "instead of" Treas. Reg. § 25.2514-3(c)(4) (1972) on this issue).
I.R.C. § 2041(b)(2) (1976) is virtually identical to I.R.C. § 2541(e) (1976). Its sig-
nificance is explained infra in the text.
37. Treas. Reg. § 25.2514-3(c)(4) (1972) provides: "[W]here the failure to exercise
the power, such as the right of withdrawal, occurs in more than a single year, the
value of the taxable transfer will be determined separately for each year." This regu-
lation could be read to mean that the release occurs in both years. However, this is
not a sensible reading of the regulation. The right clearly was not released or exer-
cised in the first year (either a release or an exercise would be deemed a transfer
under I.R.C. § 2514(b) (1976)). Furthermore, the right did not lapse in the first year,
but only in the second year. The passage of the year without the exercise of a demand
right is not the equivalent of a lapse of the right. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-3(f)
(1958) (Example 2 describes a cumulative power which does not lapse by virtue of the
year ending without it being exercised; I.R.C. § 2041 (1976) is the estate tax counter-
part to § 2514).
Treas. Reg. § 25.2514-3(c)(4) (1972) is referring to the lapse of a noncumulative
power to withdraw a certain amount each year - such an example immediately pre-
ceded the sentence quoted above - not a power which extends into the following
year.
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I.R.C. sections 2041 and 2541, a lapse of a demand right is a
taxable release to the extent that the money over which all
such rights extend during the calendar year exceeds $5,000 or
five percent of the trust funds. Thus, rights extending over
two calendar years present a problem, raising the possibility
that the donee may have to pay a gift tax (or use up his uni-
fied credit)38 and include trust property in his estate. The fol-
lowing example illustrates the problem. Suppose the donee
may demand up to $5,000 out of a contribution for sixty days
following such contribution. On November 15, 1982, a $5,000
contribution is made to the trust (which has less than
$100,000 in it). The demand right is not exercised. Although
the lapse of the demand right is not a "release" of the
$5,000,39 any further lapses during 1983 of demand rights held
by the donee will constitute releases by the donee under
I.R.C. sections 2041 and 2514. Thus, if the donor wants to
transfer additional funds to the trust in 1983, but does not
want the donee to have to pay gift tax or use his unified credit
(assuming the donee will not exercise his right), the donor will
have to wait until November 2 to do so, so that the demand
right does not expire until the following year. Waiting until
November 2 would also avoid the estate tax part of the prob-
lem, which is that a release under section 2041 is considered a
transfer of property.4 ° The property transferred would be in-
cludible in the donee's gross'estate to the extent that property
transferred is includible under I.R.C. sections 2035 through
2038.41
These potential problems can be solved in several ways. If
the trust is drafted to allow a certain period of time regardless
of whether that period extends into a subsequent year, contri-
butions can be made at a date early enough so that the right
38. Of course, if the donee were also the sole beneficiary of the trust, there would
be no gift. See Lischer, supra note 36, at 20.
39. I.R.C. §§ 2041(b)(2), 2514(e) (1976).
40. I.R.C. § 2041(b)(2) (1976).
41. I.R.C. § 2041(a)(2) (1976). The effect of I.R.C. §§ 2035(a) and 2035(d)(2) (1976
& West Supp. 1981) is clear. See Stephenson, Tax Benefits of Gifts Increased as a
Result of Several Provisions in the New Tax Law, 55 J. TAX. 218 (1981). However,
drafters of all Crummey powers over more than $5,000 or five percent of the trust
corpus would also be well advised to consider the impact of I.R.C. §§ 2036-38 (1976).
Compare Lischer, supra note 36, at 21 with Estate of Green v. Commissioner, 64 T.C.
1049 (1975).
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expires before the end of the year. Second, the trust can be
drafted to restrict gifts subject to the demand right to those
made prior to a certain date, such as December 1, and to re-
quire that the demand right be exercised within the taxable
year of the contribution. Third, the trust could allow the right
to be exercised any time until a certain period beyond the tax-
able year of the contribution.42
The third solution (which actually only addresses the
problem under I.R.C. sections 2041 and 2514, since it obvi-
ously would work only if the gift is made early enough to al-
low the donee sufficient time to exercise it within the year of
contribution) requires careful drafting. Trusts involving de-
mand rights have often limited the total which "may be de-
manded in any one year" to $3,000 (or $5,000); such phrasing
would fail to accomplish its purposes. If in early 1982, B made
a demand for $3,000. due to a contribution made in 1981, B
would under the above terms have no further demand rights
in 1982. To avoid such a result, the trust instrument would
have to make clear that any demand is to be attributed to the
year in which the contribution giving rise to the demand right
was made.
There are, however, problems which are exacerbated by
the third solution because it will often mean that the demand
right is outstanding for a longer period of time. Explanation
of these problems requires a brief discussion of the estate and
income tax rules applicable to the holder of a Crummey de-
mand right.
If the donee of the demand right dies before the right
lapses, the amount subject to his power is includible in his
estate.43 Therefore, the longer the demand right is outstand-
ing, the greater the risk of inclusion in the donee's gross
estate.
44
The income tax problems arise because the grantor trust
provisions of the I.R.C. attribute to the holder of a Crummey
42. Such a provision was used in I.R.S. Private Letter Ruling 8121069 (Feb. 26,
1981).
43. I.R.C. § 2041(a)(2) (1976). This is probably so even if the holder of the right is
legally incapacitated to exercise it. See Simmons, supra note 15, at % 1712.
44. If the demand right extends over more than $5,000 or five percent of the trust
anyway, extending the period it is effective makes it slightly more likely that I.R.C. §
2035 (1976 & West Supp. 1981) would be applicable.
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demand right his proportionate share of trust income, deduc-
tions and credits.4 His proportionate share is determined by
the ratio of the funds subject to his demand right to the value
of all trust funds.40 This ratio is then adjusted appropriately if
the donee held the demand right for less than the entire
year.47 Because of this latter adjustment, the length of time
the demand right is outstanding becomes important. 8
D. Trustee's Power to Expend Income or Principal
Another drafting issue which merits additional attention is
the scope of the trustee's power or duty to expend income and
invade principal for the benefit of someone other than the do-
nee of the demand right. As explained below, if this power or
duty is not subordinated to a demand right, then the demand
45. I.R.C. §§ 671, 678(a)(1) (1976). Such attribution is probably not made if the
grantor of the trust is treated as the owner of the trust funds under I.R.C. §§ 671-79
(1976). I.R.C. § 678(b); see Simmons, supra note 15, at 1713.2 (despite statutory
language, I.R.C. § 678(b) (1976) should not be limited to powers over income). Such
attribution occurs even if the holder of the right cannot legally exercise the power
without the appointment of a guardian. Rev. Rul. 81-6, 1981-1 C.B. 385; Simmons,
supra note 15, at % 1713.3.
46. See Rev. Rul. 67-241, 1967-2 C.B. 225.
47. See generally Lischer, supra note 36, at 19.
48. There is an additional income tax issue which requires the attention of draft-
ers of trusts with Crummey demand rights. Under I.R.C. § 678(a)(2) (1976), the do-
nee is treated as owning that portion of the trust with respect to which he has "re-
leased or otherwise modified" his demand right, if after such release or modification,
he "retains such control as would within the principles of sections 671 to 677, inclu-
sive, subject a grantor of a trust to treatment as the owner thereof." This provision
could easily present a problem. For example, if the donee is entitled to receive trust
income in the discretion of a nonadverse party, as defined in I.R.C. § 672 (1976), he
has retained sufficient control to trigger I.R.C. § 678(a)(2) (1976). (As with I.R.C. §
678(a)(1) (1976), § 678(a)(2) probably does not apply if the grantor of the trust is
treated as the owner of the trust funds under I.R.C. §§ 671-79 (1976). See supra note
45.)
The reference to "release" indicates that LR.C. § 678(a)(2) (1976) may not apply
to lapsed powers, since in other instances where Congress wanted a lapse to be con-
sidered in part a release, it specifically so provided. I.R.C. §§ 2041(b)(2), 2514(e)
(1976). Alternatively, I.R.C. §§ 2041(b)(2) and 2514(e) (1976) could be invoked by
analogy so that a lapse would only be considered a release to the extent the funds
subject to the power exceed $5,000 or five percent of the funds out of which the right
can be satisfied. Finally, it is possible that a court would hold that for income tax
purposes, any lapse is a release.
The first of the three theories appears the most compelling. However, because the
income tax rules are independent from the gift and estate provisions (see, e.g., Farid-
Es-Sultaneh v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1947)), which of the three rules
will be applied remains an open question.
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right may be a future interest within the meaning of I.R.C.
section 2503(b).
Suppose B has, for a specified time after a contribution, a
right to demand the lesser of $10,000 or the donor's contribu-
tion to the trust,4 9 but the trustee has absolute discretion to
use income and/or principal for the benefit of C. Suppose fur-
ther that this trust is construed as giving the trustee the
power, even after receiving a demand from B, to use all trust
funds for C's benefit: B's right to the trust funds would then
be subject to the trustee's discretion. As noted above, if the
donee's rights are subject to the trustee's discretion, the donee
does not have a present interest under I.R.C. section
2503(b).50
On the other hand, suppose the trust is construed as giving
the trustee the power to use the funds for C unless the trustee
has received a prior demand from B. Such a demand right is
an interest which can expire in two ways: passage of the time
for exercise specified in the trust instrument or depletion of
the trust. In this case, if, in a year in which the donor contrib-
uted $10,000, $10,000 remains in the trust at all times that the
demand right exists, the full exclusion is appropriate."1 But if,
for example, a day after the demand right became effective,
the trustee used all trust funds for C's benefit and there were
no further contributions by the donor, then no exclusion
would be allowed because the demand right was not effective
for a long enough period.52
49. B's demand right would also be limited to a total of $10,000 with respect to
contributions made during the year.
50. See supra note 6.
51. This assumes that B is the only one with a demand right. Suppose, however,
that D also had a demand right for the lesser of $10,000 or the donor's contributions
to the trust. Further suppose that the trust provided that if the demands exceeded
the contributions, the contributions were to be split evenly between B and D and that
in that case if either had already received more than one-half of the total contribu-
tions, he would be obligated to return the excess. (Alternatively, the trust could sim-
ply limit a donee's rights to his pro rata share of contributions.) In this situation a
contribution of $10,000 to the trust would give rise to an exclusion of only $5,000 with
respect to B (as well as to D). Rev. Rul. 80-261, 1980-2 C.B. 279. This rule is impor-
tant if, for example, the donor had already during the same year transferred $10,000
outright to D and nothing to B.
52. See generally I.R.S. Private Letter Ruling 8126047 (Mar. 31, 1981) (for an
exclusion based on a demand right to be appropriate, trust must have sufficient assets
reducible to cash to satisfy the demand right).
The donor could argue with this result, maintaining that it was the trustee's con-
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The more difficult question is whether the exclusion would
be available if, for example, the trustee depleted the trust fifty
days aftpr a contribution to a trust which provided that the
demand right would expire sixty days after a contribution. It
is arguable that the exclusion should not be available because
a reasonable donee could plan on waiting until the end of the
period so as to maximize the information on which to base his
decision as to whether or not to exercise his right. For this
reason, effectively extinguishing the right before the full pe-
riod would render the right to some extent illusory. However,
if the donee were fully informed that such depletion was pos-
sible, then whether the exclusion should be available should
turn on whether the time before depletion, here fifty days,
was long enough in light of the factors already discussed (i.e.,
time to have a guardian appointed, to make the demand and
to make a well-considered decision).
Suppose that instead of having absolute discretion, the
trustee has the power and, in fact, the duty, to use all trust
funds only if needed by C in certain emergency situations.
Suppose further that the trustee is empowered to recover, for
this purpose, any amount paid to B during the year. Essen-
tially, B's right would be subject to the contingency that C
have no sufficiently expensive emergency within the year and
would thus be a future interest." If, on the other hand, the
trustee is to honor B's demand only if C has no current emer-
gency, without the power to recall funds paid to B, then the
availability of the exclusion depends on the occurrence and
timing of any emergency and upon disclosure to B of the pos-
sibility of depletion of trust funds."
duct and not his which caused the premature extinguishment of the demand right,
and that under Rev. Rul. 81-7, 1981-1 C.B. 474, it is the donor's conduct which is
crucial. Such an argument should not prevail. First, despite any implication in Rev.
Rul. 81-7 1981-1 C.B. 474, the focus under I.R.C. § 2503(b) (1976 & West Supp. 1981)
is on the rights received by the donee, not on the donor's conduct. Maryland Natl
Bank v. United States, 609 F.2d 1078 (4th Cir. 1979); Blasdel v. Commissioner, 58
T.C. 1014, 1018 (1972), aff'd per curiam, 478 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1973); Rev. Rul. 79-
280, 1979-2 C.B. 340. Second, even if the donor's conduct were crucial, it was the
donor who empowered the trustee to effectively extinguish the demand right.
53. See Rev. Rul. 80-261, 1980-2 C.B. 279 (exclusion is only available with respect
to funds which cannot be recalled by the trust).
54. I.R.S. Private Letter Ruling 8213074 (Dec. , 1981) rules on a trust under
which if a beneficiary has an emergency, the trustee has discretion to invade the trust
corpus for the benefit of that beneficiary. The I.R.S., however, analyzes the trust as if
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These problems involving automatic or potential loss of
the exclusion can be avoided, if that is what is desired, by
making it clear that the demand right has priority pver the
trustee's powers or duties to use the trust principal or income
for other purposes.55 Alternatively, the right could only have
priorty over invasion of principal"8 if the donor is satisfied
that the principal will not depreciate below the desired exclu-
sion before the demand right has been effective for a sufficient
period of time.
E. Who May Be the Donee of a Demand Right?
To assess whether the Crummey demand right rule is ap-
propriate, one must first analyze the most important Crum-
mey drafting issue: must the donee of a demand right have
any relationship to the trust other than as possessor of a de-
mand right? In other words, could A obtain an exclusion for
C's demand right by setting up a trust under which B gets the
income annually and the corpus in ten years, and C is given a
right to demand $10,000?
Only one case has addressed this issue. In Jacobson v.
United States,57 the trustee had the absolute discretion to use
income and principal for the care, comfort, support, health,
maintenance and welfare of the adult children of the grantor.
All trust funds were to be distributed to the children when
the youngest reached age thirty-five, which would occur, bar-
ring deaths, in 1982. If a child died, his share became the sub-
ject of a new trust for the benefit of his children. Finally, each
child of the grantor had a special power of appointment to
have his share of the trust transferred outright to his children,
the grantor's grandchildren.
The grantor claimed an exclusion, asserting that the spe-
cial power of appointment was the equivalent of the Crummey
demand right. The court denied the exclusion, essentially
holding that for an exclusion to be appropriate, the "principal
the trustee had the discretion in the absence of any emergency. Why it does so is
unclear. Nevertheless, the existence of this ruling makes reliance on the analysis in
the text less certain.
55. I.R.S. Private Letter Ruling 8103074 (Oct. 23, 1980) involves such a trust.
56. I.R.S. Private Letter Ruling 8121051 (Feb. 26, 1981) is based on a trust of this
type.
57. 1978-2 U.S. T.C. 1 13,256 (D. Neb. 1978).
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beneficiaries" of the trust must have an immediate right to
the use or enjoyment of trust assets. The court then found
that the children of the grantor, not the grandchildren, were
the principal beneficiaries. (Even if the grandchildren had
been the "principal beneficiaries," this should not necessarily
have entitled the grantor to exclusions.)58 The court explained
this finding by noting that the provisions for the grandchil-
dren depended on contingencies which might not occur and
that the grantor listed the children and their wives as donees
on his gift tax return. This explanation of how the court de-
termined the principal beneficiaries is inadequate. The adult
children's interests are contingent just as the grandchildren's
are: contingent upon the trustee's exercise of discretion and
upon survival until 1982. Why the listing on the gift tax re-
turn is relevant is unclear. So what criteria were really being
applied to determine who was a "principal beneficiary"? And
what criteria should be applied? Perhaps the likelihood of the
interest vesting should be multiplied by the value of the inter-
est. Then how is the likelihood to be determined if it is depen-
dent on the trustee's discretion? And how many principal
beneficiaries may there be? Where is the line between princi-
pal beneficiaries and other beneficiaries? The questions are
endless because the court has established a vague test -
"principal beneficiaries" - and articulated no guidelines on
how to apply it.
The I.R.S., in its private letter rulings, has tacitly adopted
a more sensible and theoretically sound approach: the donee
of a demand right need not have any other relationship with
the trust. In I.R.S. Private Letter Ruling 8003152,1' for exam-
ple, a trust is set up under which the donor's descendants are
to receive distributions of corpus (life insurance policies on
the donor's life) and income according to an "external, ascer-
tainable" standard. Upon the lapse of a policy or the termina-
tion of the trust (which was to occur within three years after
the donor's death), the donor's wife was to have a special
58. Even if the grandchildren were the "principal beneficiaries," the court would
have had to find that the special power of appointment was exercisable only on the
grandchildren's behalf and in the capacity as guardian of the grandchildren, since a
right in A on his own behalf to direct funds to B is not a present interest in B. The
court does not appear to recognize this.
59. I.R.S. Private Letter Ruling 8003152 (Oct. 29, 1979).
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power of appointment to designate among the descendants of
the donor and their spouses, widows or widowers who shall
receive the assets. Also, at the time of each contribution all
descendants and their spouses would have a right to demand
up to $5,000. The I.R.S. held that because of the demand
right, exclusions were available with respect to all descendants
and their spouses. However, the I.R.S. did not discuss the
value of the spouses' interests in the contributions once the
demand right expires. In fact, all of the spouses' interests in
the trust (aside from the demand right) were incapable of val-
uation: none could show that his or her interest had any value,
since nonmathematical proof concerning the wife's probable
exercise of her special power of appointment would not be al-
lowed.60 This ruling thus supports the theory that the donee
of a demand right need not have any other relation to the
trust. Even if the I.R.S. is assuming that each spouse could,
and would be allowed to, show that his or her interest in the
trust after the expiration of the demand right has some value,
the I.R.S. does not discuss the possibility that the value is less
than the annual exclusion. If the donee's interest in the trust
other than the demand right can be worth less than the an-
nual exclusion, why cannot the donee have no other interest
in the trust?
As discussed above, the rule tacitly adopted in the I.R.S.
private letter rulings is theoretically sound. 1 Ownership of a
future interest in property does not determine whether one
has a present interest in that property. Crummey ruled that a
present right to demand $3,000 is a present interest worth
$3,000. If Crummey is correct, the transfer of a demand right
alone should qualify for the annual exclusion - the fact that
the donee does not also have a future interest is irrelevant.
(The income beneficiary is not required to have the remainder
interest also before the donor is allowed an exclusion.) Logi-
cally, the finding of a present interest cannot be conditioned
on the existence of a future interest.
60. See supra notes 13-14.
61. Cf. Simmons, supra note 15, at 1705.3 (allowing exclusions for demand
rights given to third parties appears theoretically correct, but "fails by the smell
test").
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IV. THE APPROPRIATENESS OF THE DEMAND RIGHT RULE
Now that the outlines of the demand right rule have been
explored, the appropriateness of the rule can be examined. As
explained above, the rule undermines the present interest re-
quirement and could conceivably be used to evade the gift tax
generally. For example, suppose a donor wishes to set up a
trust under which his minor child will get the accumulated
income and corpus at age twenty-five. Clearly, this is a future
interest for which the donor is not entitled to an exclusion.
However, by including a demand right which he knows will
not be exercised, he is able to obtain an annual exclusion.
Mere form allows him an annual exclusion on what is realisti-
cally a future interest.
Furthermore, due to the fact that the donee of a demand
right need have no other relationship to the trust, the demand
right rule enables the donor to avoid the gift tax altogether.
Suppose, in the above example, the corpus was worth $50,000.
By giving $10,000 demand rights to his brother, sister, parents
and the beneficiary, the donor could exclude the entire
$50,000 transfer under I.R.C. section 2503(b), thus avoiding
all gift tax on the transfer.62 In other words, one can, without
altering the intended disposition in a real way," obtain as
many exclusions as one can find people who will not exercise
their demand right.6 4 It is true that where such a tacit under-
62. I.R.C. § 2503(b) (1976 & West Supp. 1981). By splitting the gifts with his
spouse, the same donor could exclude a transfer to the trust of $100,000. See, e.g.,
I.R.S. Private Letter Ruling 8112087 (Dec. 29, 1980). If, however, a demand right is
made contingent on a gift being split, the exclusion may be denied. I.R.S. Private
Letter Ruling 8022048 (Mar. 4, 1980).
63. Agreements concerning nonexercise are discussed infra. However, it should be
noted that agreements are often unnecessary among family members who are aware
of the donor's purpose.
64. There are admittedly burdens assumed by the donee of a demand right which
could conceivably discourage some from participating in such a scheme. First, if the
donee dies while the right is outstanding, the amount subject to the right is includible
in his estate. However, this hardly seems a substantial barrier to finding demand
right donees willing to cooperate. Most demand rights are outstanding for a period
lasting less than two months. Furthermore, most donors will have the ability to
choose young donees. Finally, many donors will be able to choose donees with estates
sufficiently small that $10,000 or $20,000 will not cause the estate to be taxable due to
the unified credit. See also supra note 34.
The second burden assumed by the donee of a demand right is that part of the
trust income is attributed to the donee for the period during which the demand right
is outstanding. However, the income tax liability will almost always be very small. For
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standing concerning nonexercise exists, the right in reality
example, a donee with a right (lasting a month) to demand $10,000 would be liable
for one-twelfth of the trust's income on $10,000 which might be $1,200, making the
donee's income from the trust $120. This hardly creates a burdensome income tax
liability. Moreover, the donee could make a demand for a sum equal to his expected
income tax liability. Whether the distribution, pursuant to the partial exercise, can
constitute income to the donee is an open question. Compare Simmons, supra note
15, at 1 1713.5 (distribution can be income in a complex trust) with Covey, The Es-
tate Planning Benefits Available Via a "$5,000 and 5%" Withdrawal Power, 34 J.
TAx. 98, 99 (1971) (open question). This issue would need to be resolved so that the
donee would know how much to demand to cover his income tax liability. Moreover,
an adverse resolution of this issue could make slightly less attractive the distribution
(in complex trusts) of demand rights to taxpayers in high income tax brackets. A
favorable resolution renders the income tax problem almost nonexistent, for even if
the donee is in a high income tax bracket, his demand for an amount equal to his
extra income tax liability would result in an almost de minimis decrease in trust as-
sets as compared to there being no demand right. If there is a favorable resolution
and the donee is'in a low income tax bracket, there may be no overall decrease. See
also supra note 34.
Third, to the extent that the demand right exceeds $5,000 or 5% of the trust, the
donee (who is not a sole beneficiary) must normally be willing to be subject to a gift
tax or use part of his unified credit.
A fourth burden is that to the extent the demand right exceeds $5,000 or 5% of
the trust, the donee (who is not a sole beneficiary) runs a risk under I.R.C. § 2035
(1976 & West Supp. 1981). See supra note 41 and accompanying text. However, as
discussed previously, the risk can be reduced by choosing donees who are young or do
not have substantial assets. Furthermore, the amount included under § 2035 would
hardly be substantial.
With regard to the third and fourth burdens described in this note, it should be
pointed out that if the donee has another power of appointment which he allows to
lapse, there may be a problem with regard to the $5,000 or 5% limitations. The rea-
son is that the $5,000 or 5% limitations apply to all of a taxpayer's powers lapsing
during a year.
There are, however, possible means to avoid the third burden. One way would be
for the trust to provide that with respect to the excess over $5,000 or 5% of the trust
corpus, the demand right expires 30 days after the final day of the year. Thus, there
would be no "release" in either year under I.R.C. § 2514(e) (1976). Szarwark, supra
note 33, at 493. There are two drawbacks to this solution. First, extending part of the
demand right exacerbates the estate and income tax problems. See discussion supra
this note and notes 43-48 and accompanying text. Second, this solution does not work
if the transfer is made pursuant to a plan under which similar contributions are to be
made each year to the trust. This is so because, assuming the trust has less than
$100,000 in it and assuming the demand right is for $10,000, the donee would have a
full $5,000 lapse in the first two years solely due to the first contribution. The lapse of
any additional right in the second year would be a taxable release.
Another means to avoid the third burden assumes different facts. Suppose a donor
wants to give $200,000 to a beneficiary outright. He could transfer the $200,000 to a
trust and give demand rights of $20,000 to the beneficiary and to each of nine donees
not including his spouse. He could split the ten $20,000 transfers with his wife, so
that the entire transfer would be excluded. Furthermore, the trust could provide that
upon lapse of the demand right the money is to be distributed outright to the benefi-
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does not exist, and if the right does not really exist, the exclu-
sion should not be available.6 But the problem is that the
burden of proving the existence of such an understanding is
currently on the government s6 and this is a difficult burden to
sustain, which may be why the I.R.S. has not been challenging
the demand rights. The result is that taxpayers are currently
using Crummey to obtain annual exclusions to which they
should not be entitled 7 and are thereby avoiding the gift tax.
(Such an abuse would be a problem even if there were no pre-
sent interest requirement.)6"
ciary. Because the money is to be distributed outright to the beneficiary, the donees'
release of the demand rights would be transfers of present interests; thus $10,000 of
the $20,000 would be excluded. The other $10,000 would not be treated as a transfer
under I.R.C. § 2514(e) (1976), since 5% of $200,000 is $10,000.
The above discussion is based on an important assumption, i.e., that under Treas.
Reg. § 25.2514-3(c)(4) (1972) the "aggregate value, at the time of the lapse, of the
assets out of which" the demand rights could be satisfied is $200,000. If the demand
rights lapsed simultaneously, the assumption would appear correct under a technical
reading of the regulation, since at the moment of lapse, the trust contained $200,000.
However, if the donees' demand rights expired at different times, each surviving de-
mand right should be considered a contingent liability. Whether and how to value
such contingent liabilities has not been explored in the case law or rulings. Cf. 3 A.
CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 1268 (4th ed. 1980) (noting the problem of valuing a
corpus with contingent liabilities).
One commentator has asserted that the value of the "assets out of which" the
demand right could be satisfied is the value of the contribution. Lischer, supra note
36, at 22 n.26. This supposes that the trust is drawn to restrict the assets available for
distribution (pursuant to the exercise of the demand right) to the contribution. This
is not only not required, but not advisable. See Szarwark, supra note 33, at 491 (ad-
vising that trusts provide that the trustee may "borrow against, sell or distribute any
asset held by the trust... to satisfy the beneficiary's withdrawal rights"). See also
Treas. Reg. § 25.2514-3(c)(4) (1972).
65. See generally Rev. Rul. 81-7, 1981-1 C.B. 474 (demand right must not be
illusory).
66. Analogous case law indicates that the government has this burden. Under
I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1) (1976), the issue often arises as to whether a decedent who had
transferred his residence but continued to live there until his death had an under-
standing with the transferee at the time of transfer that he could continue to reside
there. Implicit in the cases is the premise that the government must prove the under-
standing: the courts speak of "adequate grounds for inferring an agreement," Estate
of Linderme v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 305, 307 (1966), while if the taxpayer had the
burden of proving the nonexistence of an agreement, the courts would discuss the
"lack of evidence to refute the existence of an agreement."
67. See, e.g., I.R.S. Private Letter Ruling 8003152 (Oct. 29, 1979); Huff, The Five
and Five Power, 15 INsT. EST. PLAN. 1 700, 704.2 (1981) (the "expectation is that
such power of withdrawal will not be exercised"); Heaszey, Crummey Power Revis-
ited, 59 TAXEs 76, 77 (1981) (the demand power is a sham in most cases).
68. If there were no present interest requirement, the donor in the example in the
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With these observations in mind, the question becomes:
should Crummey be judicially overruled or modified to pre-
vent the abuse? And, if so, on what grounds? The demand
right meets the requirements of a present interest set out in
the regulations - the donee has an unrestricted right to the
immediate use of the money subject to the demand right.6 9
Moreover, this regulatory definition is reasonably consistent
with I.R.C. section 2503(b) and has arguably been approved
by Congress' failure to establish a different statutory defini-
tion of a present interest. Because of these factors, a court
would be in error in striking down the regulation. 0
However, in light of the significant potential for abuse of
the Crummey demand right, a court could put the burden of
proving the nonexistence of an agreement concerning nonex-
ercise on the taxpayer. Because it is so difficult to prove a neg-
ative, this would make exclusions based on demand rights dif-
ficult to sustain. In light of the fact that the demand right is
hardly ever included for valid reasons (i.e., where there is a
real chance the right may be exercised 71), such a rule does not
appear unreasonable. However, it is the position of this author
that a court should not create such a rule for the reasons dis-
cussed below.
The problems with shifting the burden of proof are two-
fold. First, the practical effect would be uncertain. There is no
certainty that the I.R.S. would take an aggressive litigating
position with respect to demand rights even if a court were to
shift the burden of proof. The I.R.S. has been strangely dor-
mant in this area and it is difficult to determine whether
shifting the burden of proof would arouse it. If the I.R.S. were
not aggressive, abuse of the demand right would continue,
punctuated perhaps by I.R.S. challenges to particularly egre-
text (assuming first that he has created no demand rights) would have made a gift of
a future interest to his minor child. The donor should, in the absence of a present
interest requirement, be treated as having made a taxable gift of $40,000: $50,000
minus the $10,000 exclusion with respect to his minor child. However, by including
demand rights which will not be exercised and thus do not alter the intended disposi-
tion in a real way, the donor avoids all gift tax.
69. Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3 (1972).
70. See generally B. BrrrER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INcoME, ESTATES & GnTS
1 110.4.2 (Supp. 1982) (and authorities cited therein).
71. See supra note 31.
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gious abuses. All that would be accomplished would be an in-
crease in taxpayer uncertainty.
The second and more important problem with shifting the
burden of proof is that the Crummey demand right rule, as
currently formulated (including the burden of proof issue), is
too firmly established to permit such a judicial modification.
The I.R.S. has accepted the rule and innumerable trusts have
been written in reliance on it. At a certain point, which Crum-
mey has reached, a rule of law becomes so widely accepted
and relied upon that it is no longer appropriate for a court to
alter it. Such a rule must be changed, if at all, by Congress.
The Supreme Court articulated this policy in United States v.
Byrum:7 2
The holding [at issue] ... may have been relied upon in the
drafting of hundreds of inter vivos trusts. The modification
of this principle now sought by the Government could have
a seriously adverse impact [upon those who relied on it]
.... Courts properly have been reluctant to depart from
an interpretation of tax law which has been generally ac-
cepted when the departure could have potentially far-reach-
ing consequences. When a principle of taxation requires re-
examination, Congress is better equipped than a court to
define precisely the type of conduct which results in tax con-
sequences. When courts readily undertake such tasks, tax-
payers may not rely with assurance on what appear to be
established rules lest they be subsequently overturned. Leg-
islative enactments, on the other hand, although not always
free from ambiguity, at least afford the taxpayers advance
warning.73
As noted, the Crummey demand right is universally used and
has been fully accepted by the I.R.S. The Byrum policy ap-
pears clearly applicable. Thus, it is to the potential congres-
sional remedies that this article now turns.
Congress, in fashioning a means of curbing the abuse, has
two primary choices. First, it could statutorily shift the bur-
den of proof. However, as noted, such a reform might not be
effective due to the uncertainty of I.R.S. enforcement. More-
72. 408 U.S. 125 (1972). See also Beaton v. Commissioner, 664 F.2d 315, 317 (1st
Cir. 1981); Wyly v. Commissioner, 610 F.2d 1282, 1295 (5th Cir. 1980); Crown v. Com-
missioner, 67 T.C. 1060, 1064 (1977), afl'd, 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978).
73. Byrum, 408 U.S. at 135.
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over, if the I.R.S. were aggressive and taxpayers persisted in
trying to meet the burden of proof, the administrative burden
on the I.R.S. and on the courts would be heavy because of the
factual analysis required.
The more workable solution would be for Congress to sim-
ply provide that the creation of a general power of appoint-
ment in another - which is what a demand right is - cannot
give rise to an exclusion. Regardless of whether valid demand
rights (that is, those which realistically may be exercised)
should qualify for the exclusion, the fact is that the existence
of such valid demand rights is rare. 4
In response to this proposal, one could argue that the
abuses described - generally, the use of accomodating third
parties to increase the excludable part of what is essentially a
gift to one donee - are not peculiar to Crummey. A donor
could give present income interests each worth $10,000 to sev-
eral people with the understanding that they would within the
year give the income interest to the intended recipient.7 5 Such
74. See supra note 31.
75. This opportunity is more limited than the Crummey method. The main addi-
tional limitation is that this alternative structure is not completely effective when the
donor does not want the beneficiary to have immediate enjoyment and so arranges
that the conduit parties convey a future interest to the beneficiary. In such instances,
the donees of the demand right would have to pay a gift tax or use their unified
credit, unlike the Crummey situation where under I.R.C. § 2514(e) (1976) the donees
of the demand right are treated as if they made no transfer if the amount released is
small enough. See supra note 36. The conduits would probably agree to pay the gift
tax in exchange for the brief use of the money, the retention of a small portion equal
to the tax, or perhaps reciprocal favors. The abuse in such cases exists in the avoid-
ance of the progressive rates (and/or the "use" by the donor of the conduit's unified
credit) which would have made the total tax higher if the gifts to the ultimate benefi-
ciary had all come from one donor.
An additional limitation arises from the fact that under I.R.C. § 2041 (1976) the
lapse of a demand right over the greater of $5,000 or 5% of the trust is not deemed to
be a release, so that with respect to this part of the lapse, I.R.C. §§ 2035-38 (1976 &
West Supp. 1981) cannot be triggered.
There may be additional limitations depending on the resolution of the issues
raised supra in note 34 and accompanying text.
One advantage this method has over the demand right method is that there is no
possibility for I.R.C. § 678(a)(2) (1976) to be triggered. See supra note 48. However,
since grantors of demand rights can avoid the § 678(a)(2) problem to the extent it
exists, by choosing the donees carefully, this advantage is not particularly significant.
Another advantage is that I.R.C. § 2035 (1976 & West Supp. 1981) has broader appli-
cation to the lapse of a demand right to the extent the right exceeds $5,000 or 5% of
the trust than § 2035 does to actual transfers of a similar amount. See § 2035(d); see
also Stephenson, supra note 41. However, this advantage will only have an effect in
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an opportunity for similar abuse raises two questions. First,
how can one theoretically justify a different rule for the two
situations? If powers of appointment cannot give rise to exclu-
sions, why should a taxpayer be able to exclude transfers of
$10,000 each to A and to B, if B later that year transfers
$10,000 to A? Second, if the effect of the proposed rule is to
channel the evaders into this alternative abuse (the "conduit
method"), would we be doing the law a disservice in that it
may be more difficult to prove that the conduit method is be-
ing used, that is, that there is an agreement between the tax-
payer and B?
The first problem, justifying a different rule for Crummey
demand rights as opposed to the conduit method, can be
solved by distinguishing the two situations. First, in Crummey
situations, but not in the conduit method, there is a clear di-
rect connection between the demand right transferred from
the donor to the donee and the interest being released (by
nonexercise of the demand right) to a trust beneficiary. This
direct connection provides some basis for a different rule. Sec-
ond, technical differences also exist. Unlike the conduit in the
conduit method, the donee of the Crummey demand right,
upon release of his right, is not considered, for either gift or
estate tax purposes, to have made a taxable transfer to the
extent his right did not exceed the greater of $5,000 or 5% of
the trust assets .7 This distinction indicates that in this way
the Crummey demand right abuse is more serious than the
conduit method, creating a greater need for correction.7 Fi-
nally, and probably most importantly, there is, as noted
above,7 8 rarely any valid reason for the demand right, whereas
there may be many instances where for valid reasons A gives
to B, C and D, and C and D later give to B.
rare instances. See supra note 64.
76. I.R.C. § 2514(e) (1976) (see supra note 36); I.R.C. § 2041 (1976). With regard
to the gift tax issue, this means that to this extent, the donee of the demand right
neither uses part of his exclusion with respect to the trust beneficiary nor pays gift
tax (assuming prior use of the unified credit). Without the protection of § 2514(e),
the donee of the demand right would, similar to the conduit in the conduit method,
do one or the other depending on the disposition under the trust instrument of the
funds upon release of the demand right. See supra notes 64 and 75 and accompany-
ing text.
77. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text; see also supra note 64.
78. See supra note 31.
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The next issue - whether denying exclusions based on
powers of appointment will channel evaders into the conduit
method which is more difficult to detect - arises from the
direct connections and from the lack of valid reasons for the
demand right. Because of those two factors, it is easier to
prove the existence of an understanding when the Crummey
right is used than when the conduit method is used. Why
then, as a matter of policy, should we make more difficult the
abuse we could more easily detect? The answer is that the
conduit method will not be used as frequently as the demand
right has been. Crummey stamped the demand right with offi-
cial approval, stating that it did not matter that there was no
realistic chance of exercise (though it did not approve an ac-
tual agreement not to exercise the right). With such encour-
agement, it is not surprising that the demand right has been
used so frequently. On the other hand, there has been no such
approval of the conduit method. Because of this lack of ap-
proval, and because of the very nature of the conduit method,
many lawyers and taxpayers who use Crummey without hesi-
tation would probably consider the conduit method an unethi-
cal scheme in which they would not participate. For this rea-
son, shifting the burden under Crummey would not result in
widespread use of an abuse which is more difficult to prove.
In summary, the proposed amendment, denying exclusions
based on powers of appointment, is defensible both theoreti-
cally and in terms of protecting tax revenue. However, it is
the position herein that such an amendment should not be
enacted except in conjunction with two additional reforms:
elimination of the present interest requirement and the re-
placement of the per donee exclusion with a flat exclusion of a
certain value. These reforms, which are independently justifi-
able, should be enacted in conjunction with the proposed
power of appointment rule so that established estate plans,
created in reliance on the Crummey demand right rule, are
not unfairly disrupted. This protection of estate plans is ex-
plained further following discussion of the two reforms.
V. THE PRESENT INTEREST REQUIRMENT
The appropriateness of the present interest test must ini-
tially be examined in light of the original purpose of the test
and of the exclusion itself. The Senate Report accompanying
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what was to become I.R.C. section 2503(b) stated in relevant
part:
By subsection (b) of the House Bill a gift or gifts to any one
person during the calendar year, if in the amount or of the
value of $3,000 or less, is not to be accounted for in deter-
mining the total amount of gifts of that or any subsequent
calendar year. Likewise, the first $3,000 of a gift to any one
person exceeding that amount is not to be accounted for
.... Such exemption, on the one hand, is to obviate the
necessity of keeping an account of and reporting numerous
small gifts, and, on the other, to fix the amount sufficiently
large to cover in most cases wedding and Christmas gifts
and occasional gifts of relatively small amounts. The exemp-
tion does not apply with respect to a gift to any donee to
whom is given a future interest. The term "future interests
in property" refers to any interest or estate, whether vested
or contingent, limited to commence in possession or enjoy-
ment at a future date. The exemption being available only
insofar as the donees are ascertainable, the denial of the ex-
emption in the case of gifts of future interests is indicated
by the apprehended difficulty, in many instances, of deter-
mining the number of eventual donees and the values of
their respective gifts.79
The purpose of the exclusion, though not fully articulated,
appears to have been to exclude most normal Christmas, wed-
ding and birthday gifts, so as to reduce the record-keeping
burden on the taxpayers, the supervisory burden on the I.R.S.
and the time pressures on the crowded courts.80 The present
interest requirement, in turn, was added because Congress did
not want the exclusion, the purpose of which was to reduce
the administrative burden, to increase the burden by requir-
ing valuation of future interests. As will be explained, this ra-
tionale does not make sense.81
Valuation of future interests is not burdensome and
presents no problems that valuation of present interests does
79. S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1932).
80. It is not consistent with this rationale to allow the first $3,000 to be excluded
when the gifts exceed $3,000, for the burdens on the taxpayer, the I.R.S. and the
courts are not thereby lessened. However, comparable taxpayers should be treated
comparably: the donor of $3,500 should not be taxed on $3,500, while the donor of
$3,000 is taxed on nothing.
81. Why Congress found it persuasive is unclear.
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not present. Suppose A transfers $100,000 to a trust which is
to distribute the income to B for twenty years and then dis-
tribute the corpus to C. The value of C's future interest can
be ascertained by reference to the tables. Suppose B's interest
lasts until his death. B's life expectancy may be ascertained in
the tables, as can the value of his interest; one can refer to the
remainder tables to determine the value of C's interest (based
on B's life expectancy). Suppose that at the end of B's income
interest, the principal goes to D, if alive, and, if not, to C.
There are tables which estimate D's chance of surviving B; as-
sume the tables say the probability is 25%. Then C's interest
is worth 75% of what it was in the second hypothetical and
D's is worth 25% of that same figure. Finally, suppose that at
the end of B's interest, the principal goes to C, but if D is
alive he gets one-half of the principal. C's interest is worth
87.5% (50% plus 75% of the other 50%) of what it was in the
second hypothetical and D's is worth 12.5% of that figure.
The hypotheticals represent basic types of future interests: af-
ter a term of years, after a life estate, a contingent remainder
based on surviving another, and a vested remainder subject to
open, respectively. All may be easily valued by reference to
the tables. If, on the other hand, the conditions upon which
the contingent remainders or vested remainders subject to
open depend would require, for valuation of the future inter-
ests, consideration of certain probabilities incapable of mathe-
matical proof, the value of the remainder interest would likely
be held to be not reasonably ascertainable, 2 and thus no ex-
clusion would be available.8
In short, in light of the valuation rules outlined above,
there would be little administrative burden created by al-
lowing gifts of future interests to be eligible for the exclusion.
Moreover, any burden that would be created would be the
82. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text. Examples of such interests
would be interests conditioned on the birth of children or the exercise of the trustee's
absolute discretion. As noted supra, the fact that the valuation would be for exclusion
purposes would render courts more likely to find the value not to be reasonably
ascertainable.
83. In some instances, an absolute minimum value of the vested remainder sub-
ject to open could be established - one-half the value of the full remainder interest
in the example in the text. If the class which could share in the trust has no ascer-
tainable limit, such as "D's living descendants," no such absolute minimum value
could be established.
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same as that involved in valuing present interests, for the
same rules apply in valuing present interests. Valuation tables
are available to value most interests and those which are inca-
pable of valuation without consideration of nonmathematical
probabilities are likely not eligible for the exclusion for that
reason. Thus, there is no reason for Congress to distinguish
present interests from future interests under I.R.C. section
2503(b). Because the existence of this distinction in the stat-
ute creates litigation" and the accompanying administrative
burden, and because at least some of the normal birthday and
Christmas gift-giving is probably in the form of future inter-
ests, Congress' original purpose in providing for the exclusion
would be better served by deleting the present interest
requirement.
As discussed in Section VI, the annual exclusion has as-
sumed an additional function in addition to its original pur-
pose of excluding birthday and Christmas gift-giving. That
new function is as an estate planning tool. Because this func-
tion is an inescapable part of the annual exclusion, amend-
ments to the statute must be considered not only in light of
Congress' original purpose, but also in terms of whether they
are consistent with the exclusion's estate planning function.
The issue with respect to any proposed amendment is thus
whether it creates any inequities when considered in light of
the fact that the exclusion will be used as an estate planning
tool. The elimination of the present interest requirement cre-
ates no such inequities. Allowing exclusion of future interests
does not unfairly benefit any particular group of people, nor
does it conflict with either of the goals of the gift tax - pro-
tection of the estate and income tax.e5 (The means by which a
rule can create inequities is illustrated in Section VI's consid-
eration of the "per donee rule.") Thus, the annual exclusion's
function as an estate planning tool poses no obstacle to the
proposed elimination of the present interest requirement.
84. For a discussion of some of the issues arising under the present interest re-
quirement, see generally J. RBKMI & M. JOHNSON, FRmmtL INcoME, GIrr AND ESTATE
TAXATION § 51.11 (1981).
85. See, e.g., Crown v. Commissioner, 585 F.2d 234, 235 (7th Cir. 1978).
1982]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
VI. THE PER DONEE RULE
Currently, the annual exclusion is applied separately to
each donee. This rule had its foundations in the original pur-
pose of the annual exclusion: exclusion of usual Christmas and
birthday gifts ("normal gifts"). This original purpose, how-
ever, is not entirely consistent with current practice. Even a
quick survey of the private letter rulings and gift and estate
tax literature cited herein reveals that the annual exclusion is
not regarded by the wealthy as statutory relief from the bur-
dens of declaring normal gifts. Instead, the annual exclusion is
regarded as an estate planning tool by which a donor may
pass money to others without gift or estate tax. Undoubtedly
these same donors engage in normal gift-giving in conjunction
with full use of the exclusion pursuant to their estate plan.
In light of these circumstances, there are three primary al-
ternative amendments to I.R.C. section 2503 which Congress
might consider. First, the annual exclusion could be elimi-
nated, since for many it appears to be serving a different pur-
pose than the one for which it was enacted. This would be an
unwise change. To some extent, elimination of the exclusion
would trigger scrutiny by the I.R.S. of normal gifts and the
corresponding record-keeping burdens on taxpayers, precisely
the excessive administrative burdens which Congress sought
to prevent. Furthermore, to a large extent, taxpayers would
probably ignore the absence of the exclusion and not report
small gifts; at the same time, the I.R.S. undoubtedly would
not be diligent in tracking down de minimis gifts. Thus, disre-
spect for the law would be engendered. This disrespect would
be much more widespread than it is now, because currently
the only taxpayers giving - and probably not reporting -
normal gifts in excess of the annual exclusion are the wealthy
who use up the full exclusion pursuant to their estate plan.
For the others, the exclusion serves its original purpose.
A second possible amendment to section 2503 would be to
restrict the annual exclusion to outright gifts in an effort to
limit the exclusion to its original purpose - normal gifts.
This would allow exclusion of most normal gifts, especially
since many taxpayers who currently make normal gifts in
trust would alter their mode of gift-giving. The problems with
this solution are twofold. First, the wealthy would, by altering
their mode of gift-giving, undoubtedly continue to use the ex-
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clusion as an estate planning tool, though admittedly this use
would be slightly reduced because outright gifts lack the flex-
ibility of trusts to suit the desires of the donor. The second
problem would be that many donors would, as noted, alter
their manner of gift-giving. To the extent that the altered
manner of gift-giving would not reflect their wishes as a trans-
fer to a trust would, the result would be dissatisfied taxpayers
and in many cases unwise transfers.
The third alternative is based on a recognition that there
must be an exclusion to exclude normal gifts. But there is no
way to provide a statutory exclusion which would exclude nor-
mal gifts which would not be used by the wealthy as an estate
planniiig tool. Such recognition leads to the conclusion that
the statute should be drafted in such a way that the exclusion
will be fair and appropriate as an estate planning tool. In this
light, the per donee rule makes little sense. Why should the
donor with one other family member be limited to use of the
tool only to the extent of $10,000, while the donor with a large
family can make perhaps $200,000 worth of use of the same
tool?s8 Not only is the latter donor able to avoid estate taxes
more successfully, but he is also better able to avoid the pro-
gressive income tax rates by shifting more income-producing
funds away from himself to those in lower brackets.
Thus, recognition that the annual exclusion is and will be
used as an estate planning tool leads to the conclusion that
the per donee rule should be replaced by a flat exclusion ap-
plicable to the sum of all gifts for the year.87 The figure could
be, for example, $50,000. However, the choice of the precise
figure should be based on policy decisions as to (1) what con-
stitutes "de minimis" gift-giving (gift-giving not worth inves-
tigating for the I.R.S.), (2) the extent to which money should
be transferable without tax,88 and (3) the extent to which es-
86. This argument assumes that the Crummey demand right rule has been legisla-
tively overruled, so that exclusions are only available based on real transfers of value.
87. One additional virtue of this proposed amendment is that it renders ineffec-
tive the conduit method as a means of avoiding the limit of the exclusion. In other
words, because the exclusion would no longer be phrased in terms of each donee, one
could not obtain extra exclusions by channeling transfers through third parties.
88. In making this decision, consideration must be given to the purpose of the gift
tax: protection of the estate and income tax. See, e.g., Crown v. Commissioner, 585
F.2d 234, 235 (7th Cir. 1978).
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tablished estate plans using numerous exclusions should be
disrupted.8"
VII. TIMING OF THE REFORMS
It is this writer's position that an amendment denying ex-
clusions based on powers of appointment should not be en-
acted except in conjunction with the elimination of the pre-
sent interest requirement and the per donee rule. The reason
is that unless the latter reforms are also enacted, elimination
of the Crummey demand right will undermine the effective-
ness of estate plans which have been previously set up in reli-
ance on 'the current state of the law. Public expectations
should not control legislation, but where additional reforms
which would protect valid expectations are independently jus-
tifiable, they should be enacted.
An example of a typical trust will illustrate how expecta-
tions would be protected. Suppose a life insurance trust has
been established. The policy premiums, which are $5,000 a
year, are currently paid by the grantor who excludes each
year's transfer based on demand rights possessed by the trust
beneficiaries. Under the terms of the trust, the trustee has,
after the death of the grantor, discretion to invade corpus or
to distribute income to provide for the needs of the benefi-
ciaries, who are the grantor's spouse and three minor children.
The spouse has a testamentary special power of appointment
to direct the trust corpus and accumulated income to the
grantor's descendants living at her death.
If the only reform enacted was that exclusions were no
longer allowed based on demand rights, this estate plan could
not accomplish its intended purpose. The grantor could not
exclude his premium payments because they would not qual-
ify as transfers of present interests to the beneficiaries. The
trust, without other funds, could not pay the premiums (and
could not borrow enough to pay all the premiums). The gran-
tor would thus have the alternatives of using his unified credit
with regard to transfers to the trust to pay the premiums or
allowing the policy to lapse. Either alternative would be dis-
ruptive of the grantor's estate plan.
If, on the other hand, the present interest requirement and
89. See infra note 91.
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per donee rule were eliminated at the same time that the de-
mand right rule was legislatively overruled, the grantor would
be able to continue to exclude his premium payments. The
elimination of the present interest requirement would render
irrelevant the fact that none of the beneficiaries would have a
present right to the $5,000 transfer. Deletion of the per donee
rule would also be necessary; otherwise, no exclusions would
be available because the value of each beneficiary's interest
would not be ascertainableY' Thus, only the simultaneous en-
actment of the three reforms would assure the continued ef-
fectiveness of many estate plans.9 1
VIII. CONCLUSION
In light of the fact that the Crummey demand right is
hardly ever used for valid purposes and could be used to sub-
stantially evade the gift tax, Congress should amend I.R.C.
section 2503 to deny exclusions based on powers of appoint-
ment. In order to avoid disrupting estate plans created in reli-
ance on current law, Congress should pass two further, inde-
pendently justifiable amendments of I.R.C. section 2503,
deleting the present interest requirement and the per donee
rule.
90. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
91. Admittedly, some estate plans would be disrupted, i.e., those which currently
use the exclusion in an amount exceeding the flat figure that would be set as the new
limit. This should not, however, prevent enactment of the necessary reforms. Al-
though legislators should consider legitimate expectations when contemplating new
legislation, public expectations should not, as noted, control legislation. It must be
recognized that all change upsets some valid expectations. Furthermore, the legisla-
tors could, to the extent desired, reduce the disruption by setting a high figure for the
flat exclusion.
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